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Equality and the Mentally Retarded

I

Death or banishment would very positively have alleviated the difficulties encountered by society in its dealings

with those persons born into that society with what it
describes under the heading mental defects or mental deficiencies.

But in deference to society's sensitivity to

the obvious injustice associated with such radical remedies

and the guilt that would inevitably become its legacy,

society has opted for a more comfortable alternative in our

public facilities for the mentally ill and the mentally

retarded
There had always been a most satisfying simplicity
in this approach, which sense of satisfaction was seldom

assailed by criticism from those most directly affected.
The famed English facility of Bedlam, moreover, stood ever

2

available as the ultimate evil of its type against which
our own facilities could reliably be compared with favor.

Recently

,

however, public attention has been directed

to our facilities; and what had previously been a toler-

ably comfortable abstraction gradually transformed into
the depressing reality we have come to know as Willowbrook,

or Belchertown State School, or other such facility in
all its concrete ugliness.

It was at last being made

clear that rather than being comfortable retreats for
those not equal to the demands of life in conventional
society, these places were in fact nothing but dismal

warehouses for society's rejects.

Even those in govern-

ment, finding themselves in positions of authority in

such facilities, came to realize increasingly that the

only apt adjective for prevailing conditions is 'inhuman.'
The Director of New York's Willowbrook State School com-

pared the treatment accorded the mentally retarded at his
facility with the treatment traditionally reserved for
criminals: "We're treating the mentally retarded as if
they have somehow offended society."^The implementation of alternatives to the present

typical institutional arrangement gives rise to enormous

difficulties, not the least of which is a large, reliable
and continuing appropriation of public funds together with

responsible patterns and machinery for its distribution.

3

The more offensive elements of life in
the institution
are gradually undergoing change for the better.

This is

not, it seems, the result of a radical shift in
philoso-

phical priorities, but rather

public pressure.

a

belated reaction to growing

A more selective screening of institu-

tional populations is being undertaken such that in time
orily

those really in need of this kind of structured

environment will be institutionalized, while those capable
of living in and benefiting (and benefiting from) normal

social environments will be required to do so.

So long,

however, as society produces and counts among its number

persons mentally defective or deficient, such institutions

will and must continue to exist.
It is probable that those conditions will abate which

have characterized our facilities as (in the words of one

Massachusetts state official)

"snake pits."

Nevertheless,

it is a matter of first importance to lay the proper

foundation for the future structure and role of the
institution.

The institution's reduced population as well

as those discharged from the institution must effectively

be guaranteed the equal protection of the

lav/s

of our

state and federal governments, and must be rendered justice
no less than that rendered to the rest of us.
The scope of our present inquiry is both legal and

philosophical in nature, dealing as it does with the notion

4

of equality, with particular emphasis on how that notion
is judicially construed within the context of the equal

protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the constitutions of the
states, and on how that notion so construed relates to
the class of mentally retarded persons.

I

propose to

survey the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
that most directly relate to that class, more specifically
the Massachusetts Mental Health Act, for the purpose of

showing a particular respect in which that statute (which
by and large is a model of enlightened legislation of its
is nevertheless deficient; specifically in its

type)

failure to contain a provision for independent supervision
of its full and even-handed administration.

This arguably

could be achieved by the establishment of autonomous legal

counsel and advisory services outside the framework of the

Massachusetts Department of Mental Health or other state
agency
I

further propose against the background of operative

state law to survey judicial decisions construing the equal

therefrom
p iDtection clause with an eye to abstracting
the judicially recognized ingredients of the concept of

equality as they might be appropriate for any consideration of the mentally retarded as a class.
I

shall discuss certain writings of Ch. Perelman and

5

of Bernard Williams on the subject of equality in an

attempt to support my conclusion that legislation essentially
similar to House Bill No. 2690 of the 1972 Massachusetts

Legislature ought to be enacted into law establishing an
autonomous watchdog agency or office, substantially

improving the liklihood that justice will not be denied
to the mentally retarded through the arbitrary adminis-

tration of otherwise good laws.
appears as Appendix A.

(House Bill No.

2690

Appendix B incorporates Chapter

893 of the Acts of the 1973 Massachusetts Legislature,

limitedly providing legal assistance to the indigent

mentally ill.)

II

But what are the conditions that prevail at such

places as the Belchertown State School (which by public
report appear not so loathsome as many other facilities
both in and out of Massachusetts) which prompt us to
allege that the residents of these facilities have been

effectively denied justice and the equal protection of
the laws?

An exhaustive ansv/er to that question would

inevitably result in
space, and

I

a

disproportionate allocation of

shall accordingly give an overview of

conditions based in part upon long, direct, personal
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observation, in part on the continuing investigations

made by an organization of friends and families of the
residents, and in part on the reports of public commissions
set up for the purpose of investigation of facility con-

ditions

.

Recently these efforts prompted

a

class action suit

to be brought in the Federal District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, which suit named the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts and a number of individuals in or connected
with the Department of Mental Health as defendants.

The

suit made claims founded upon the deprivation of rights,

privileges and immunities secured to facility residents
by the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the

imposition of cruel, unusual and unlawful conditions
which were alleged to be in derogation of the rights
secured by the eighth amendment.

It was also claimed

that the residents we re denied the equal protection of
the laws secured by the fourteenth amendment.

This litigation recently terminated in a consent

decree, leaving to implication rather than to judicial

finding that there had in fact been

a

violation of any

of the above mentioned rights of residents.

While a

most desirable result from the point of view of the
immediate concerns of the petitioning class and further
as an indicator of more enlightened administration in

7

days to come, nevertheless we are not given the benefit
of an exhaustive judicial analysis (or complete record
for appeal to higher courts) which might otherwise have

become a persuasive precedent for future citation.

Compromise and settlement have traditionally characterized consitutional controversy, with notable exception

currently evident in the United States House of Representatives.

The adoption of consent decrees tends to

achieve immediate objectives without however setting
bounds to the scope of future judicial resolutions.
On the occasion of the entry of the consent decree
in the case referred to, U. S. District Court Judge Joseph
L.

Tauro acknowledged this point:

know that there is

I

have been to Belchertown.

a

great deal that needs to be done there.

I

recog-

I

nize that this is not the end of the line for

Belchertown, and I'm very, very satisfied that
the responsible public officials recognize that

Belchertown, as all other institutions, has to
be under a constant state of review

;

but

I

do

think that what we have been able to accomplish

here is to give some immediate relief to people

who absolutely can't help themselves.

I

think

that we have reached down to help those who are
3

helpless in the truest sense of the word."
added)

(emphasis

The court pleadings in that case include allegations

that "the conditions in which the plaintiffs and the

class they represent live are so shockingly oppresive,

unsanitary, unhealthy and degrading that they are an

affront to basic human decency and a violation of fundamental constitutional rights." 4
In 1964, a special commission was established by

the Massachusetts legislature to investigate and study
the training facilities for retarded children.

Their

report appears as 1964 House Bill 3061 in which it was
stated (and restated again in the pleadings in this case)
that the State School at Belchertown was characterized
by "isolated geographic location

.

.

.

drab atmosphere.

.

a past, present and future state of inertia and somnolence
.

.

obsolete patient dormitory buildinas requiring very

.

extensive modernization
.

.

critical

5

.

"

.

.

.

the problem of ventilation

i

This report continued to point out that there

was a serious overcrowding condition there resulting in

residents being "forced to live in situations far below

minimum standards" established by the Massachusetts

(the)

Department of Public Health.

The report cited "the com-

plete inadequacy of the basic medical care and supervision
of

.

.

.

residents

.

.

.

flagrant lack of social service

workers, psychologists and psychiatric personnel

.

.

.

desperate need for doctors, nurses, licensed practical

9

nurses

.

.

.

conspicuous neglect in the provision of

attendants and therapists

...

a

manifest shortage of

teaching personnel and rehabilitation specialists

.

.

.

totally inadequate educational rehabilitation programs
.

.

.

marked limitations in services (education)

"

as

instances of the conditions that were brought to light
as a result of the investigation of the state schools.

These uncontradicted revelations were the prelude
to four years of uninterupted inattention by the state
to conditions it could in no administrative or legal

way (short of class litigation) be compelled to rectify.
In 1968 The American Association on Mental Defici-

ency (Division of Special Studies, Institutional Eval-

uation Project, Final Evaluation for Belchertown State
School, May, 1968, Appendix

A)

issued a report (portions

of which were reprinted in the pleadings of the class

action suit) which included the following:
The major weakness in the management is a marked

shortage of qualified professional and ward personnel

.

.

overcrowded

the institution is still seriously

.

.

.

.

limited staff precludes a com-

prehensive diagnostic evaluation prior to admission
and sometimes immediately following admission
.

.

.

training and staff development are major goals

of the institution; but limited activity is pre-

sent

.

.

.

apparently there are no regularly sched-

uled interdisciplinary conferences for supervisory

10

personnel of all departments

.

.

therefore, over-

.

all communi cation is somewhat limited

.

.

.

inability

to recruit an assistant executive officer prevents

the Superintendent frcm more active participation
in the program of the institution
of an open door policy

.

.

.

.

.

absence

.

medical service is

handicapped by the shortage of medical personnel
.

.

.

the hospital is not accredited by the Joint

Commission on Hospital Accreditation

.

.

because

.

of a shortage of personnel, the institution depends
on the services of residents for productive service
.

.

.

the insufficient number of attendant personnel

makes it difficult to take care of the needs of
the residents and almost eliminates time for ade-

quate housekeeping.

The sleeping areas reflect the serious overcrowding,
and the toilet and bathing areas do not offer any

privacy

.

.

.

most of the buildings are overcrowded

with limited bathing and lavatory facilities

.

.

.

there are no adequate facilities for the storage of

janitorial equipment or for clean and soiled
laundry in the residential buildings

.

.

.

there is

no adequate indoor play area or adequate space ror
staff, equipment, and counselling in the living
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units

.

.

.

all the outdoor recreation areas

are fenced in and rather meagerly furnished with

equipment

.

.

there appears to be quite limited

.

freedom of movement of residents about the institution grounds

.

.

.

all buildings are locked

and most of the recreation areas attached to the

buildings are enclosed in high metal fences
in general,

.

.

.

the attitude towards the residents

appears to be primarily that of benevolence with
rigid rules and very limited regard for the dig-

nity and potential self-reliance of the individual.
The pleadings state that the then Assistanct Commissioner
of the Department of Mental Health for Mental Retardation,
on January 14, 1969, visited the facility and in a written

report cited his impressions of nudity, lack of sanitation,

poor ventilation, overcrowdedness, restraint, assaults,
improper use of discipline, lack of safety and privacy,
roaches, staff shortages, and homosexuality.
In 1970,

a

Special Legislative Commission on Training

Facilities Available for Handicapped Children restated
the general criticisms of the facility and pointed out that

"differences among institutions, and even within institutions,

highlight glaring inequities in treatment for certain individuals and raises the question of the unfair distribution
of the Commonwealth Treasury."

g

It pointed out that the

12

the greatest inequity "was demonstrated by prevailing

conditions for the large number of residents who are in
so-called 'back wards.'
ized by

.

.

.

.

.

.

Back wards are character-

repression of individual freedom and

personal development through the excessive use of locks
and heavy metal doors and by the enormity of buildings
and numbers of patients assigned to dormitories

.

.

.

day rooms or recreation rooms (are) characterized by over-

powering odor.

Patients often appear nude or dressed

in institutional garb.

purposeful activity, communication or any inter-

a lack of

action

There is a lack of programs and

7

.

The Legislature in 1971 received a report from the

Joint Special Commission on Belchertown State School and

Monson State Hospital which stated:
Belchertown is nearly a total failure and needs
immediate and direct attention.

...

At Belchertown

the buildings are old, crowded, sparsely furnished and

frequently cold. Repairs at times go unattended for
months.

On occasion, the fire alarm system has been

Within the past three months, raw

inoperative.

sewerage has backed up and overflown portions of rhe
Infirmary.

.

.

.

Doors to residential buildings often

cannot be opened due to the age of the locking system.
.

.

.

At Belchertown there are continuing unnecessary

shortages of sanitation supplies, such as disinfectant, detergents and mops, directly resulting in
the daily spread of infection among the residents.

.

Dysentery has been recurrent the last several years,
boils and diarrhea occur on a daily basis.
are not uncommon.

.

.

.

Rashes

Staff members have found it

necessary to purchase from their own funds such items
as disinfectant, detergent, soap,

tooth paste, flash-

lights, deodorant, scissors, shampoo, buttons and

thread.

.

.

.

There has been no overall professional

inspection and evaluation of Belchertown in over
year.

.

.

.

a

The medical laboratory at Belchertown

causes delay in needed patient care.

...

In some

buildings at Belchertown excrement and urine are

constantly visible and unattended.

...

In the past

there has been insufficient clothing for the resi-

dents resulting in prolonged nakedness and degradation.

.

.

.

Cockroaches have been chronic, ever

present and in the recent past, have overrun several

buildings to the extent of crawling over immobile
patients.

.

.

.

Parts of the living quarters at

Belchertown are in violation of the State Sanitorv
Code.

Because of lack of screens, flies have in-

fested several buildings to the extent that fly
larvae (maggots) have been found nested in a sore on

.

a

resident

s

ear.

.

.

As to food, until recently,

.

the entire meal was served to many residents mixed

...

in a single metal bowl.

of privacy at Belchertown.

.

There is no semblance
.

.

Psychiatric and

psychological treatment is practically non-existent.
•

•

•

Punishment has bordered on cruel and abusive

treatment.

Discipline has been unevenly administered

with little relationship to the gravity of the offense
.

.

.

Until recently, Belchertown had the highest

reported incidence of physical and chemical restraint
of any state school.

.

.

.

Unnecessary and incorrect

medication has been given to residents.

.

.

There

.

is no aggressive recruitment program for professionals

The education, vocational education and recreation

staffs are insufficient and cannot provide realistic

services for the school pupulation.

.

.

Due to

.

negativism by administration officials, the volunteer
v

program has failed to attract available student
participation from surrounding colleges.

.

.

.

Prescribed medical care is delayed or ignored for
long periods of time.

There are frequent shortages

of medical supplies and drugs.

In many cases,

recommended corrective orthopedic surgery, as well as
the fitting of eyeglasses and hearing aids has been

delayed for several years.

These delays further

15

reduced the resident's ability to function and in
some cases delayed discharge from the institution
for years

....

Appropriated funds for furnishing

an addition to the administration building were

allowed to laose delaying the use of the building
by twenty-one months.

.

.

.

Due to lack of screening,

residents have fallen 15 to 20 feet over second
story railings to the ground.

.

.

.

Because of the

lack of initiative, Belchertown State School

has failed to fully utilize available Federal funds.
.

.

.

The cn-ground hospital, responsible for the

provision of much of the medical services received
by the 1200 residents, is not accredited by the

national certification agency, the Joint Commission
on Hospital Accreditation.

g

The conditions reported above are not reflective currently

prevailing conditions, for very strenuous ameliorative
policies have been mandated by the Federal District Court
in the class action suit.

being achieved.

These, to some degree, are

To the degree that they are not, continuing

class action litigation remains the sole remedy of persons concerned for the welfare of the retarded residents
of the facility.

This is prohibitively expensive, slow,

and in general a far cry from that adequate watchdog machinery, which constitutional law and justice requires.
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Moreover

,

without such machinery, the welfare of the

residents is made to be contingent upon the continuing

concern and activity of a few interested members of society,
and upon the continuing benevolence and competance of

state administrators.
An examination of the operative law in this state will

clearly reveal that the power of the Commissioner of the

Department of Mental Health is truly plenary;

and the

above description of conditions reveals how plenary powers
have traditionally been exercised at Belchertown.

With regard to the continuing concern of non-official

non-residents, while it is gratifying to see how much
can be achieved by properly applied and very public

pressure, there is no warranted confidence that other

concerns and interests will not, as in the past, preempt

concern for the retarded.
Other provisions must be made.

Ill

That branch of our state government charged with

responsibility for those of its citizens characterized
as mentally retarded is the Department of Mental Health.

The Department is a creature of statute, by legislation

incorporated into the General Laws of the Commonwealth in

17

G.

Chapter 19, which contains 30 sections.

L.

introductory section (Sec.

From the

we are given the following:

1)

The Department shall take cognizance of all matters

affecting the mental health of the citizens of the

commonwealth and the welfare of the mentally retarded.

...

The Department shall have supervision

and control of all public facilities for mentally
ill or mentally retarded persons and of all persons

received into any of said facilities and shall have
general supervision of all private facilities for
such persons.

.

.

The Department shall have super-

.

vision and control of all hospital, state schools,
.

.

.

and other mental health facilities.

Sections 16 and 21 embody 1966 legislation creating

a

mental health advisory council consisting of thirty persons,
and a twenty-one member community mental health and retar-

dation area board for each of the departmental regions of
the state extablished pursuant to Section 18.

The council is made up of gubanatorial appointees

who serve without compensation, is composed of

a

mixture

of area board members and members of designated socially

oriented professions, and whose function, suggested by
its name, is to "advise

...

ment
.

.

.

.

.

.

to obtain the views

participate with the depart-

...

to review annual plans

make recommendations" and in short to be and function

18

as executive adjunct of the commissioner of the department

and to have power solely by his grace.

porates G. L. Chapter 19, Section

(Appendix C incor-

16)

Similarly, the area boards are constituted with specified professional heterogeneity of its members who also

serve without compensation and "shall be an agency of the

commonwealth, and shall serve in the department." Appendix
D incorporates G. L. Chapter 19, Section 21)

members may be employees of the department.

None of its

Selection of

area board members is, notwithstanding advisory contributions of others, strictly the act of the commissioner
of the department.

The duties and powers of the area

board (detailed in Section

23)

no more effectively constrain,

nor are its decisions and recommendations more binding
upon, the commissioner than in the case of the council.

The commissioner remains the ultimate and sole repository
of all the power and authority legislatively conferred by

Chapter

19

The commissioner of the department is appointed by
the governor and must be a psychiatrist.

He "shall have

had substantial administrative experience in mental health

facilities or agencies.

.

.

.

(and)

may appoint and

.

.

remove such agents and subordinate officers as he may

deem necessary, and may establish such divisions in the

department as he deems appropriate from time to time.

.

19

(Section

5)

Section

9

authorizes the commissioner to appoint full

time legal counsel "to serve as legal counsel to the

commissioner.
In addition to the commissioner and the assistant

commissioner for mental retardation. Section

19

also

establishes the position of regional administrator for

mental retardation, who is charged with performing such
duties as law and the commissioner may assign.

His juris-

diction is limited to one of the six regions set up on the
basis of geographic and demographic factors.

Section 12 sets up an advisory council for "the planning,

construction, operation or utilization of facilities for the

mentally retarded,
ex officio.

..."

the commissioner being a member

The advisory council is charged with con-

sulting and advising the department relative to community
needs for such facilities and to the development of programs for their realization.

Section 14 states that at state schools for the men-

tally retarded the facility

11

shall establish and maintain,

subject to appropriation, research and demonstration projects in vocational rehabilitation in cooperation with the

federal vocation rehabilitation program."

(emphasis added)

The commissioner and subordinate departmental officials

have no authority to disregard this legislative mandate.

other than failure of appropriation;

and all investiqa-

tions to date indicate that no such program has
been imple-

mented at Belchertown.
The Attorney General of Massachusetts, in a published

opinion dated March 10, 1965 (page 237), speaking of the
power of the several boards established by or referred to
in Chapter 19

(area boards, boards of trustees of the

respective facilities, etc.) stated that none of them have
the authority to compel any action by the commissioner,

but only "to suggest, to recommend, to report and encourage.
The commissioner

,

under Section 14C, has authority

to appoint to the position of Superintendent of the State

Schools, and provides only that the appointee be qualified

professionally according to specifications detailed by the
section
Section 14B establishes the board of trustees for
the individual facility, spelling out the functions of

the board in terms of being the legal entity, "a corpor-

ation for the purpose of taking and holding "the real

estate and personal property given to the institution
of which they are trustees.

The board of trustees is

under the exclusive supervision and control of the
commissioner.-

9

Nevertheless, it is the board of trustees

more than any other branch of the department (or the state)
that is charged with watchdog duties:

Section 14D states

21

that the seven member board shall meet at least three
times per year, visit and familiarize themselves with the

institution, make suggestions to the department to improve the effective, economical and humane administration
of the institution, shall have free access to all books,

records, and accounts, and at all times shall have free

access to the buildings and premises of the facility.

Section 14D(e) even provides: "They may at any time cause
the superintendent or any officer or employee of their

respective public institution to appear before them and
answer any questions or produce any books or documents
relative to the public institution."

In operation this

arrangement amounts to self policing in an area where
(as is so typically the case with governmental regulatory

agencies) experience demonstrates that self policing is

unjustifiable and unwarranted.

It has not been respon-

sibly achieved in the past, and there is no evidence to

believe that these functions can be performed by anybody
or any office not having full independence of the department
of Mental Health or other state agency with which the depart-

ment might be expected to have a natural alignment of perspective

.

The enabling portion of Chapter 19 appears in Section
26:

"The department may from time to time adopt such

rules and regulations as it deems necessary to carry

out:

the provisions of this chapter, and may amend or
repeal
the same."

Characteristically, enabling legislation does

not go into detail, but rather sets out the minimum and

maximum bounds of proposed activity, establishes general
objectives, reposes power and authorizes continuing,

amendatory revision.

Consequently it is in the body

of regulations issued in pursuance of Section 26 that

we discover how (in detail but on paper) the department
snd its subordinated units are actually supposed to function

under law.
The department nevertheless must function within the

broad bounds of applicable legislative and constitutional
provisions, the most notable legislative provision being

Chapter 888 of the Laws of the Commonwealth of 1970,
embodied into the General Laws as G.

L.

Chapter 123.

The

law is commonly called the Massachusetts Mental Health Act.
The Mental Health Act, just as Chapter 19 of the

General Laws, enables the department to issue regulations

establishing procedures and standards for "the reception,
examination, treatment, restraint, transfer and discharge
of

.

.

.

(Section

mentally retarded persons in departmental facilitie
2)

It would at this point be appropriate to restate what

"mental illness" and "mental retar-

is meant by the terms

dation."

Regulation

1

of the DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

23

REGULATIONS defines (for purposes of involuntary
commitment)
mental illness' as a "substantial disorder of thought,

mood,

perception, orientation, or memory which grossly imoairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or

ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."

Alcoholism

is excluded for purposes of involuntary commitment, but

available as a basis for voluntary commitment.
2

Regulation

of the REGULATIONS defines "mental retardation" as

"inadequately developed or impaired intelligence as

determined by clinical authorities as described in the
regulations hereunder, and which substantially limits
a person's ability to function in the community."

The

regulation correlates different levels of mental retar-

dation with the degree of deficiency in general intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior.

It also states that

a mentally retarded person may be considered to be men-

tally ill, as defined in the REGULATIONS, provided that
no such person shall be considered to be mentally ill

solely by virtue of his mental retardation.
In this paper

I

will limit my attention to the area

of mental retardation, leaving aside the unique difficulties

presented by any consideration of mental illness.
As noted above, the Act eliminates involuntary commit-

ment of a mentally retarded person to

a state facility.

If a person is at least 16 years of age he may apply for

24

voluntary admission, and

a

parent or legal guardian may

apply on behalf of a person under the age of majority
or a person under guardianship.

(18)

Any person so admitted

"shall be free to leave such facility at any time," or

may be freely withdrawn by the parent or guardian, upon
three days notice to the superintendent of the facility. 10
The REGULATIONS further provide that an applicant
for conditional voluntary admission must be informed of
the three day notice provision established by Section 11

of the Act

precondition of voluntary withdrawal from

(a

the facility)

,

and that he "be given an opportunity to

inspect and visit the living quarters and wards of the
facility if he elects to do so prior to admission," and
that he "be informed of the civil rights which he retains

after admissionn to the facility, as established in Chapter
n11
123, Sections 23 and 25.

Nothing in the Act or the REGULATIONS prescribes the

manner or circumstances of imparting civil rights information, but what is prescribed to be imparted is Section
23 and Section 25 of the Act.

It is clear, however, that

elsewhere than the two cited sections the Act provides
for the civil rights of the facility resident, and limi-

tation to these sections alone is of questionable adequacy
Further, it is inappropriate to consider only the rights

retained, since law and justice would seem to require that
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all rights otherwise possessed by the individual are retained

with certain stated and limited exceptions.
should perhaps be discussed;

These exceptions

and a right not discussed

or stated to be limitedly denied should be presumed to be

retained, absent a showing of its justified denial on any

occasion
The 'civil rights' of a mentally retarded person

specifically referred to in Sec. 23
1

- To be

&

25 include:

provided with stationery and postage in

reasonable amounts.
2

- To

3

-

have free and unrestricted mailing privileges.

To be visited at all reasonable times by anyone un-

less he is ill or incapacitated and the superintendent

determines that such
4

-

a

visit would be unreasonable.

To wear his own clothes.

5 - To keep and use his own personal possessions inclu10

ding toilet articles.
6

-

To keep and be allowed to spend a reasonable sum
of his own money for canteen expenses and small purchases.

7

-

To have access to individual storage space for his

private use.
8

-

To have reasonable access to telephones to make
and receive confidential calls.

9

-

To refuse shock treatment.

-

To refuse lobotomy.
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Other rights specified in the regulations of
the department
12 - Other rights guaranteed by

lav/

,

(emphasis added)

13 - No person, solely by reason of his admission or

commitment in any capacity to the treatment or
care of the department, shall be deemed to be

incompetent to manage his (own) affairs,
14 - to contract,
15 - to hold professional or occupational or vehicle

operators licenses, or
16 - to make a will.

Departmental regulations shall not restrict the rights
listed above as 13 through 16

but according to Section

;

23, the rights listed above as

1

through 12 may be denied

for good cause by the superintendent or his designee

and a statement of the reasons for any such denial entered
in the treatment record of such person.
It is incredible that any of the individual's "other

rights guaranteed by law" may so easily and so autocratically
be denied with what amounts to lip service to due process
in the procedural formalities which place a very slight

burden on the superintendent.

In practice, the superin-

tendent's judgment or decision based on that judgment is

not usually challenged;

or if it is challenged it is only

with great loss of time, effort, money and ultimately the

right itself that is sought to be preserved in any such
effort.

No panel or board of review is established to

monitor or pronounce upon the just and constitutional
exercise of this awesome authority given to the superintendent;

and it is integral to the thesis of this paper

that this function is essential to the requirements of

justice

,

and ought to be legislatively mandated to the

independent office of counsel for the retarded, or its

equivalent
Regulation MR 102 (which is based upon Chapter 19,
Sections 23, 25 and 29) addresses the legal and civil
rights of retarded persons with the following language:
(1)

The greatest care shall be taken to protect

the civil and legal rights of all retarded persons.

All reasonable care shall be given to insuring

that residents of all institutions for the mentally

retarded are protected, have humane treatment and
care, and are allowed such privileges as are their

right, with due regard for the welfare of the gen-

eral public, the limitations imposed by the resident'

disability and the rights of other individuals.
(2)

No resident of an institution for the mentally

retarded shall be discriminated against on the
basis of race, creed, sex, or age.

Racial segre-

gation shall not be practiced in institutions for

28

the retarded.
(3)

(This section substantially restates the
rights

listed above as
(4)

1

through 12)

The legal and civil rights of the retarded shall

include the right to privacy and protection from

commercial exploitation;

(a)

no resident shall be

photographed, interviewed, or exposed to public
view without the written consent of his custodian
and his own consent, if obtainable, and

(b)

no

resident shall be identified publicly by name or
address without the written consent of his custodian
and his own consent, if obtainable.
(5)

The right of worship shall be accorded to all

residents who desire it.

Provisions for religious

worship shall be made available to residents and,
as nearly as possible and practical, provisions for

religious activities for persons of differing creeds
shall be non-discriminatory

;

however, no individual

shall be coerced into engaging in any religious

activities
In notable addition to the above, Section 21 of the Act

limits the use of restraint of any kind "which is unnecessary
for the safety of the person being transported or other

persons likely to come in contact with him."

And in the

case of residents not being transported, restraint may be
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used "only in cases of emergency such as the occurrence of,
or serious threat of, extreme violence, personal injury,
or attempted suicide."

Section 29 of the Act makes it

mandatory on the department "in cooperation with other
state departments and agencies

.

.

.

(to)

cause to be

given to persons under its care instruction and education
as may be appropriate for such persons to undertake,

especially persons who are unable to engage in programs
for patient-trainees."

In addition to this very important

right to be educated, the Sections also mandate the estab-

lishment of work programs with approved pay scales for

participating residents.

Section 31 gives the resident the

right to obtain free medicine and drugs, with certain

reasonable restrictions.

No effort will be made to catalogue all the rights,
civil or legal, of the mentally retarded resident of
state facility.

a

It would be a list of enormous length, and

would perhaps be nothing more or le% than

a line by line

transcription of the Act and other relevant law, every provision of which might be construed as either directly or
indirectly granting to the individual resident a right
in the sense of a standing to sue for its enforcement

.

This legislation in conjunction with the rules and

regulations issued thereunder has established a classification of persons within the jurisdiction of the Common-
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wealth of Massachusetts according to their qualities of
"inadequately developed or impaired intelligence."

This

scheme of classification is to correspond to a differen-

tiation of persons in fact along the same lines, and there

must be something near consensus that special legislation
for this class of persons is appropriate.

What must be

assumed for purposes of this paper is that no creditable
challenge can be levelled against the enactment of legislation simpliciter dealing with this class of persons;

what remains as a matter of concern is whether the legislation ought to be in its existing form or whether there

ought to be changes in the form of the legislation such that

nothing directly therein prescribed or authorized runs
afoul of more fundamental concerns of our society.

Notable

in this regard is the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, treatment of

which will be undertaken at length in this paper. In addition
to the equal protection clause, it would not be inappropriate

to investigate the applicability of the due process clause,

civil rights legislation, and innumerable other legal and

moral components of our social structure which, in direct

conflict with a given provision of legislation for the
retarded, would properly be given preference.
Some preliminary considerations are in order.

First,

with regard to the voluntariness of the admission, it must
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be observed

that within the range of those whose mental

condition qualifies them for admission

a

wide spectrum

exists ranging from those whose condition is near the

borderline of normalcy all the way to those whom the
state terms "profoundly retarded."

The term "profoundly

retarded" is defined in Regulation HR 116 as indicating
that the individual designated is "functioning at least
5

standard deviations below the mean of standardized

scales

(e.

g., below 20 IQ on the Stanf ord-Binet Scale),

is very markedly deficient in self help, social and commun-

ication skills, and will probably always need protective
care."

Levels of mental retardation arc described in

terms of the degree of deficiency in general intellectual

functioning and adaptive behavior as determined by clinical

authorities within or without the department, as elsewhere detailed in the Regulations.

Typically, one or

several buildings at a facility will house persons of this

segment of the resident pppulation, and such buildings

demonstrate to the uninitiated samples of the worst of the
conditions to which earlier reference was made.

The scope

of this paper does not permit in depth survey of these

conditions;

but what must now be noted in conjunction

with voluntary admissions is that only by undue extension
in meaning can the term
to such persons.

'voluntary' be appropriately used

The options available to the profoundly
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retarded person and his family are realistically limited.
To speak of a profoundly retarded person admitting himself
is absurd.

His family's options include keeping him at home,

^t great emotional and financial strain (if physically it

can be accomplished at all) normally requiring continuous

supervision and not untypically being the prelude to the

disintegration of the family itself.

Or the family might

place the person in highly priced private facilities where

standards of care and treatment are accorded to the degree
of financial accountability of the family.

This simply

is not available to the average candidate for admission to

the state facility.

There is, moveover, a higher statis-

tical probability that persons in this classification come

from the lower social segments, and least of all can afford

alternatives to state facilities.

When recourse is had

by state personnel to the argument, in defense of charges
of misfeasance or malfeasance of legal responsibility, that

the individual is

'free to leave whenever he may choose,'

the words ring hollow as much as in the statement that

the rich man and the poor man are equally 'free' to sleep on
the park bench.

When circumstances inhibit the adoption

of any alternative the use of the term 'freedom' in describing

the situation must be qualified accordingly;

and in its

application to the profoundly retarded member of

a

poor

family the term must be understood to coexist with physical
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unfreedom to adopt any alternative to public
institutionalization.

So qualified

,

its use in argument is thoroughly

disingenuous
Of concern to the person whom legislation places
within
a given

classification for purposes of that law's oper-

ation is not only the substance of the law in question
but also its administration.

It is to this two pronged

question that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
amendment may be fruitfully applied.

For just as a law

which arbitrarily classifies for purposes of dispensing
benefits or imposing burdens is 'unconstitutional' within
the meaning of "equal protection of the laws," so also
are a person's rights, guar a nteed by this clause, infringed

by the unequal administration of otherwise equal laws.

The positive laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

dealing with the mentally retarded, while nevertheless

exposed to the criticisms mentioned above, are perhaps
among the more enlightened laws in the country.

What more

directly touch upon the lives of the residents of the state
facility, however, are the acts and decisions of administrative personnel.

This is the area where charges of unequal

treatment typically arise, and to which the general
thrust of this paper is directed.
By the character of the legislation and even the name

of the law itself, the Massachusetts Mental Health Act
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(together with other related laws such as G. L. Chapter

19)

singles out a segment of society as being within the
scope
of its application

men saw to be

conforming to what legislative drafts-

,

singling out by nature of a segment of

a

that society according to its mental or intellectual

characteristics

These characteristics were seen to be

.

at odds with those we have taken to be standard or above

standard.

Not only is this not violative of our Federal

Constitution, but rather we would expect a morally sensitive

government to make special provision for those with special
needs on the theory,

I

imagine, that a just government

should legislate for each according to his needs.

Notwithstanding the lofty idealism of the draftsmen,
statutes and executory regulation fall to less farsighted
agents for implementation;

and it is in this context

that class legislation (of which the Act is typical) can

lead to results which are violative of the equal protection
clause.

When in

a

given situation it is observed that

discrimination is occurring which is seen to be violative
of constitutional rights, it must first be determined

whether the law that is being implemented is unconstitutional or whether an equal
tered.

lav/

is being unequally adminis-

To this end it is proper to survey judicial

decisions which purport to construe the notion of 'equality'

within its meaning in the equal protection clause.
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IV

All persons born or naturalized in the United States
are United States citizens and citizens of the state
in which they reside;

and a state is forbidden to deny

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

This is as expressed in the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution
The phrase

'equal protection of the laws' is virtu-

ally mute in guiding the conduct of the states.

Cases

and controversies resolved before the courts of the states
and the courts of the United States have, however, created
a pattern of

meaning for the phrase, the most interesting

for our purposes being the decisions of the courts of

Massachusetts.

The courts of a state, just as much as

its administrative agencies, are the

'state;' and in the

statements made in a court's decision we find authoritative

commitment to standards which for all other purposes we may
legitimately call upon the state to acknowledge as admissions
and apply accordingly.

A state in its laws and in its actions may not prescribe or do anything which has the effect of denying to
any individual or class of individuals the equal protection
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of the laws.

of the laws

1

9

Nowhere has the phrase 'equal protection

been precisely defined, 1- and moreover it

is not even susceptible of exact delimitation 14

No gen-

.

zation can be laid down that is all-inclusive 18 rather
,

each case must be decided as it arises, on its own facts

16
.

The guarantee of the equal protection clause has,

however, been held to mean, among other things, that no

person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes of persons in 'like circumstances
'life,'

'liberty,'

17
,

in their

'property,' and 'pursuit of happiness

.'

18

The rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under
the same circumstances

1

9

.

Most' fundamentally stated, the equal protection clause
is not limited to state's acts in

zens;

'protecting' its citi-

rather it requires that all persons shall be treated

alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in

privileges conferred and in the liabilities and deprivations imposed.

The highest courts of the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts, in a long line of cases, have frequently

and consistantly subscribed to this principle, elsewhere
20
enunciated at length by the United States Supreme Court.

For the state to favor one class but not another similarly

situated is to deprive the class of those not so favored.

Precision is crucial in characterization of situation, cir-
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cumstances or conditions as being 'similar,' and further
in the determination that the similarities are relevant,

ot appropriate, to the purposes of the legislation (or
of the state)

under consideration.

Por the unar~

ticulated concern of the courts which demands relevance to

statutory purposes is that given any two articles or objects
in the universe, there is some

(however small) set of

characteristics the possession of which by both of the two
renders them 'similar' in circumstances.

Conversely,

dissimilarity may be established via the same analysis.

Classification as 'mentally retarded' for purposes of
admission to state institutions classes together all
those persons falling below a given level of deficiency
in general intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior,

undifferentiating the degrees of retardation of the persons
within that classification.

But identical treatment of a

profoundly retarded person and a borderline retarded person
cannot be justified simply by pointing out that they are
both retarded, but must now somehow take into account and
be relevant to the individualizing characteristics of the

persons to whom treatment will directed and to the nature
of the treatment itself.

The departmental regulations

acknowledge this in Regulation MR 116 by establishing,
for administrative purposes, five levels of retardation:

profound, severe, moderate, mild, and borderline.

It is
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equally clear that in many respects other than those

entailed in a person's being retarded, the institutionalized mentally retarded person in a state facility has
the same legal posture as all other state citizens with

regard to certain legal rights which are not conditioned
upon factors of intellectual functioning or adaptive

behavior.

Many of these are in fact codified in the Mental

Health Act and the departmental regulations.

It is too

frequently the case that these factors which are not
relevant to a given law are precisely the factors which

prevent a facility resident from fully appreciating the
extent to which the treatment accorded to him has the

effect of disenfranchising him from his entitled participation in societal functions and privileges to the unhin-

dered extent of his proven or potential ability.

Central to our consideration is the relationship
between the observable physical and mental differences
and the objects of the classification.

Reasonable, non-

arbitrary classification requires that different treatment be based upon substantive differences having

a

reasonable relation to the objects or persons dealt with
and to the public purpose sought to be achieved by the

legislation involved.

In this regard, the courts of

Massachusetts have held that the terms 'arbitrary' and
'discriminatory' have the same meaning.
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'Invidious discrimination' on any fact situation is

forbidden, but the constitutional guarantee does not

require identical treatment for all persons without

consideration of the difference in relevant circumstances 21
.

It might also be pointed out here that in making out a

case of a violation of the equal protection clause we

have also in all liklihood made out a case of

a

violation

of the due process clause as well, and probably other

state and federal civil rights

lav/s.

The scope of our

present inquiry will intentionally be limited to the
equal protection clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a charge upon the legis-

lative and other acts of 'a state'

-

not private individuals

within the state except in so far as they act in the official
capacity of representative of the state itself.

It is

state action that must be assessed as affording equal or

unequal protection of the laws within the scope of the
equal protection clause.

The federal government itself

is not bound by the eqiual protection clause.

22

The present

inquiry has discussed the Massachusetts Department of

Mental Health, an agency of the state, but not itself
the state.

Are the acts, then, of the department the acts

of the state?

In an area of the law so technical as this

the question is not frivolous.

Decisions, however, uni-

formly construe the clause to be applicable to all the
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departments of state government, whether legislative,
executive, or judicial

," 3

by which a state acts 24
.

and to all the instrumentalities
it can thus be taken as well

founded that the acts of the Department of Mental Health
and its personnel and agents

are the acts of the state

for constitutional purposes.

Acts of the department thought to be violative of
the equal protection clause present us with the issue
of what to do about it.

Cases have indicated that the

Fourteenth Amendment is not remedial or punitive, but to
the extent possible the action in question will be set

aside.

The violation may be cited as a basis for a court

of equity jurisdiction to grant an injunction against

the continuing violation.

It cannot be made the basis

for damages, since it is presumed that the person affected

will seek redress by conventional legal remedies.

2^

As earlier mentioned, the Mental Health Act's pro-

visions relative to admission and discharge are enlightened
and reasonable in comparison to other jurisdictions.

An individual mentally retarded resident is virtually free
at any time to discharge himself.

Some have seized upon

this point to argue that treatment thought to be discrim-

inatory is really not discrimination, for the reason that
any classif icatory statute, regulation or act of the state

under which those included and those excluded from the class
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in question are free to place themselves in the same posi-

tion as the other is, if discrimination at all, a purely

academic form of discrimination.

For their authority thev

cite cases in line with Hunter vs. Colfax Consol. Coal Co.,
175 Iowa 245, 154 NW 1037, 157 NW 145.

For reasons men-

tioned earlier such liberty of class inclusion, for the

retarded resident, is illusory.

His choice is most

definitely not to remain in the institution and endure,
or to discharge himself and avoid, an arbitrary act or treat-

ment;

rather the choice is actually to remain and endure

one bit of bad treatment or discharge himself and perish
in a society whose demands are beyond his ability.

Moreover, the argument based on the free interchangeability
of class inclusion and class exclusion limps in that those

who register higher than the designated level in the
intellectual screening process are simply and absolutely
not free to place themselves in the position of the resident

toward whom the treatment in question is directed.
Those who argue in this way (the number of whom has

fallen off markedly in recent years) either practice

a

form of self-deception or more probably indulge themselves
in outright hypocracy.

The nature of legislation is such that classification
is entailed.

Statutes and regulations characteristically

spell out the scope of their operation, differentiating

4

those within their scope of operation from those outside
that scope 26

To be classified is to be made or to be

.

recognized as unequal

-

and a showing of inequality under

the law or act in question is not enough to have established
its unconstitutionality under the equal protection clause.

Classification of persons or things must be 'reasonable
for the purposes of the legislation ,' 27 must be 'based
on proper and justifiable distinctions, considering the

purpose of the law,'

2p

'clearly not arbitrary,'

29

and

'must not be a subterfuge to shield one class or unduly

burden another class, or to oppress unlawfully in its
administration

.
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It is in the concrete framework of the administra-

tion of the Mental Health Act and related law that we

most frequently encounter instances of unconstitutional
treatment of the residents.

The extension of the equal

protection clause to acts, as well as legislation, is of
vital importance.

What is proscribed by the equal pro-

tection clause is discrimination, whether it be embodied
in statutory form or in that statute's administration.

Discriminatory administration of the law is unconstitu31
tional under this clause
.

It has been held that the val-

idity of a statute under the equal protection clause

often depends on how it is construed and applied.

provision (of

a law)

J

A

not objectionable on its face may be
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adjudged unconstitutional because of its effect in
actual
operation. 33

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the un-

equal enforcement of valid laws as well as the enforce-

ment of invalid laws.
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Decisions may be cited in point that actual discrimination arising from the 'administering of a law* is
as potent in creating a denial of equality of rights as
a

discrimination made by a law.^^

Depending on the nature

of the law involved, it is not necessary that the discoverv

of the elements of unconstitutionality among its provisons

requires the voiding of the entire law; rather, the uncon-

stitutional elements may be eliminated from the law, and if

what remains is a viable law, fulfilling the purposes for

which the law was originally enacted, it will to that extent
be retained in force.

When to

a

serious degree legislation

inadequately insures against abusive administration, it
is arguable that unconstitutionality inheres in this

insufficiency.

To render the law constitutional, we do

not in this case need to eliminate provisions, but to
add them;

or in lieu of further provisions of the par-

ticular legislation in question, other legislation designed to make up for the insufficiency of the challenged
law (for example. House Bill 2690 supplementing the existing

mental health statutes, or its substantial equivalent).
Other factors must be considered in this regard such as the
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nature of the interests adversely affected.

Insufficiency

in administrative provisions in legislation dealing with

the governance of lives of the mentally retarded must

clearly be less tolerable than insufficiency of equal

degree in legislation dealing with state highway contracts,

with the establishment of a commission to set official
holidays, and so

on.^

&

^

An improper legislative purpose might be the basis
for charging that a law is in violation of the equal

protections clause;

but no one contends that the state's

mental laws are contaminated with improper purpose or
motive.

Nevertheless a long line of cases point out that

in addition to a scrutiny of the legislative purpose,

regard should be given to the means provided for its

administration.

Where administrative powers are con-

ferred which permit unjust discrimination betv/een persons

otherwise in relevant and similar circumstances, the courts
have found there to have been violations of the equal

protection clause. 19
From the foregoing we might be seen to have reached
the absurd position of having established all executory

legislation unconstitutional by being violative of the
equal protection clause.

We simply know that our highest

appellate courts would never seriously entertain argument
citing the above cases as controlling precedent in any
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case aimed at the absurd conclusion just mentioned.

Instead, when cases come to the court in that posture,

they impose the burden on the one making the allegation
of unconstitutionality (founded on insufficiency of admin-

istrative procedures) to establish facts amounting to an
"intentional violation of the essential principle of

practical uniformity ." 40

This has on occasion been held

to mean a "fixed and continuous policy of unjust discrim-

ination

"

41

.

It is important here to note that we must not only

be concerned with state laws dealing directly with the

mentally retarded, such as the Mental Health Act, but
also all other legislation which designates the scope of
its operation

(or is so unequally administered)

so as to

exclude mentally retarded persons, either expressly or
(more probably)

by implication, without sustaining the

burden of demonstrating some relevant difference between
the class included and the class of the retarded.

Legis-

lation cannot be judged by theoretical standards, but

must be tested in the concrete conditions which induced
it . 40

Massachusetts courts have in fact held that in

passing on the constitutionality of

a

statute it is

important to examine into its effect in operation and
40
the results it is intended to accomplish
.

The courts approach any consideration of the constitu-
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tionality of a law's formulation or administration with
a

tendency to impose

a

very high burden of persuasion on

that side of a case or controversy arguing for unconsti-

tutionality.

What amounts to a presumption of constitu-

tionality is often supported by recourse to vague and

confusing concepts.

The Massachusetts courts have held

that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside
as the denial of the equal protection of the laws if

any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it

.
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The courts also point out that

(emphasis added)

equal protection of the

lav/s

is something which submits

to the consideration of degree.

The exercise of state

police power to classify has been held to admit of

a

wide scope of discretion and the Fourteenth Amendment
may be called upon to avoid what is classified or done
only when "it is without any reasonable basis and therefore purely arbitrary ." 45

Illustratively there is such

language as "practical equality is constitutional equality ,"
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and as stating that the term 'equal'

statutes)

(as

used in

is construed to mean "substantially equal and

not identical

." 47

Arbitrariness is dispelled on

showing

a

of proportionality such that "in the absence of relations

or conditions requiring a different result, equity (equal

protection cf the laws) will treat all members of

a

class

or
as on an equal footing, and will distribute benefits

47

impo&e burdens and charges equally or in proportion
to
the several interests, and without preferences

." 4 ^

And

again, on proportionality, the equal protection of the laws

with respect to taxation purposes does "not require identity
of treatment, but only

(1)

that classification rest on

real and not feigned differences,

(2)

that the distinctions

have some relevance to the purpose for which the classi-

fication is made, and

(3)

that the different treatments

be not so disparate relative to differences in classi-

fication as to be wholly arbitrary." 49
In further construction of the term "equal" and the

phrase "equal protection of the law" the courts have had

recourse to obscurities such as: "A classification having
some reasonable basis does not offend against the equal

protection clause because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.

(emphasis added)
One of the clearest judicial statements made concern-

ing the meaning of the clause was made by a Texas court
in the context of a tax suit:

"The equal protection clause

of the State and Federal Constitutions means that the

rights of all persons must rest on the same rule under

similar circumstances, and apply to all the powers of the
state which can affect the individual, including the power
of taxation.
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(emphasis added)
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The foregoing has been an abbreviated effort to
sur-

vey court decisions in order to abstract therefrom the

essential ingredients of the notion of equality as it
pertains to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

It is evident that such judicial statements

parallel Perelman's definition for 'formal justice,' of

which more will be said later.

These decisions have not

been formulated along lines of philosophical analysis of
the concepts that come into play in the controversy before
the court:

but in effect and without having systematically

articulated the reasoning process employed by the deciding
judge, the decisions focus in on the same points as

Perelman in his more in depth consideration of the
subject
Society has achieved virtual consensus in calling
for justice for the mentally retarded (no less than for
us all).

So long, however, as justice remains an abstrac-

tion it can comfortably be championed by all segments of
society.

Confusion and discord replace emotive unity

when we set out to secure justice in the concrete.

While

no one calls publicly for unjust treatment or policies
for the mentally retarded, perhaps one who did so might

be seen as possessing a certain redeeming candor and honesty

not characterizing another who professes to secure justice
to the retarded in ways that, upon analysis, are seen to

lead more to its denial.

Those coninc into official professional contact

with the institutionalized mentally retarded person
undertake a task of enormous difficulty and complexity;

it

is thus not surprising that disagreements should arise

concerning alternative treatments or policies of treatThe fact alone of disagreement more likely evi-

ment.

dences mere difference of honest opinion regarding the

means of achieving a commonly held professional objective,
rather than disparate views of the objective itself. But
it is precisely because justice has been viewed abstractly

and because little if any uniformity exists with regard to

what is captured within the term's scope and meaning that
it becomes necessary to develop a view of justice within

the concrete context of the class in question.
I

believe that outright bad faith is not so commonly

encountered in this inquiry

as much as simple neglect,

legislatively created and administratively sustained.

And

it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the ques-

tion of motives and personal psychologies of persons in

positions of administrative power.

But to the extent that

we can rectify the continuing neglect through amendatory

legislation, and to the extent that such an effort is
itself supported by a proper understanding of the notions

meaning
of justice and equality, specifically within its
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in the context of the equal protection clause of the
Four-

teenth Amendment

,

then accordingly a discussion of these

notions is a proper component of this inquiry, and an
apt premise to the thesis that H. B. 269C or its substantial

equivalent ought to be enacted into law.

V

In his work The Idea of Justice and the Problem of

Argument

,

Ch

.

Perelman analyses the concept of justice as

not simple, but as complex, containing a constant formal

element and a varying material element.

Formal justice

is then initially defined as the formal principle requiring

one to treat the like alike, while the variable material

element provides the criteria according to which

a

par-

ticular respect of likeness is specified.

The aforemen-

tioned consensus thus appears to reduce to

a

endorsement of formal justice.

popular

Disagreement arises

characteristically in the determination of criteria, the
selection or specification of characteristics which in
turn determine 'likeness,' these to be known as 'esential

characteristics.' He talks of persons forming (for
purpose)

'essential categories.'

a

given

The disagreements which

arise amonq departmental professionals may thus be seen ao

examples of conflicting concrete formulae of justice, dis-

5

agreements relative to essential characteristics and

essential categories.
Our survey of judicial decisions has revealed that
the holdings or dicta in cases discussing the notion
of

equality in the constituional context are replete with
endorsements of formal justice, leaving its application to
the facts of the given cases as the court's contribution
to a determination of concrete justice.

The decisions,

being mixtures of law and fact, become part of the body
of precedent which

(to more or less degree depending on

jurisdictional, factual, and other relevant considerations)
give support to the slogan "stare decisis."
"Stare decisis" is not, however, the ultimate virtue
in these considerations.

Justice William 0. Doualas, in

an interview on the CBS Evening News of September 6, 1972,

stated that "in constitutional matters,

'stare decisis' has

least standing." We should feel entirely free to choose
not to follow precedent in the decisions relatinq to the

treatment of the mentally retarded, nor to follow precedented

treatment itself, having sustained,

I

believe, the burden

of persuasion that such treatment offends anybody's pre-

analytic sense of justice.

For reasons that are part of

the problem itself, there has been no direct judicial con-

sideration of the offending conditions until recent days,
and even then the judicial resolution was

,

as earlier indi-
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cated,

based on compromise and settlement and falls short

of becoming a constructive contribution to precedent.

The public call for justice for the retarded forces
us to a metajudicial analysis of the relation of equality,

for use in relating mentally retarded persons to other

both within and without the category of the retarded, as

defined in the Mental Health Act.

Perelman compares and

contrasts the relation of equality with the relation of
identity in the following way: A and

B are

equal if they

are interchangeable, if they share properties, and if
the same truth value characterizes all propositions con-

cerning each, while A and B are identical if they designate the same object. 52

Justice will clearly employ the

relation of equality as distinguished above from identity,
and if further understood to be broadly enough construed to

encompass persons who, though equal in some respects,
are definitely not equal in other respects.

How then is

a rule of justice than mandates equal treatment for equal

beings to deal with beings that strictly viewed are neither

identical nor equal?

lie

elsewhere states that typically

complaints are registered against alleged unjust treat-

ment in that a person is not being treated like another,
or if he is being treated in the same way
be treated differently, or better.

^

,

that he should

With the relation of

sorts
identity ruled out of consideration, differences of all
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are specified in support of the
complaint;

and it is

precisely that differences that ought not to
have exercised any influence cn the decision (or law,

or policy, or

act, etc.) did so, or that differences that
ought to

have operated in one's favor were without effect.

"Cer-

tain elements, regarded as essential, and nothing
else,

ought to have been taken into consideration ." 54

Failure

of reference to relevant factors or reference to
irrele-

vant factors thus renders a decision, for example, unjust.
"Injustice, it seems, does not result here from the unequal

treatment of identical persons,

but the unequal treatment

different persons the differences between whom were

irrelevant in the instance

."
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Conversely, the equal

treatment of persons who, according to the criteria in
question, ought to have been assigned to different cate-

gories for which unequal treatment was provided, is
also an instance of injustice.
The rule of (formal)

justice is in this connection

restated as requiring that those who are essentially
similar (i.e., having no essential differences) should
be treated alike, neither specifying when they are essen-

tially similar nor how, if essentially similar, they are
then to be treated.
is the function of

Specification of essential similarity
'the rule,' whether the rule be expressed

in positive law, tradition, administrative regulation or
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the like.

If the rule specifies A and B as essentially

similar then its operation to be formally just must mete
out equal treatment.
The notion of "static justice" has had a history of

faithful service in places like Belchertown, providing

institutional administrations a defense to charges of

unjust treatment of residents.

When a rule of the facility

was challenged as being unjust, it would be humbly sub-

mitted in response that because the rule operated on all
residents alike it was therefore not unjust.

Static jus-

tice calls for the observance of an established rule

without regard to the rule's content.

Conformity to pre-

cedent is in this context seen to be not without its
hazards; that while being an appropriate factor (or even

necessary condition) of rational decision making it can
never be its only ingredient (or sufficient condition)

Historical perspective reveals that there has often been
consensus favoring treatment which was consistently followed
at times past but which is now held to be unjust by most.

Rules, acts and men are appropriately characterized
as just or unjust.

An act is said to be just if it is in

conformity with the correct application of

a rule,

suggest-

ing the patriotic assertion that we are a country of laws

and not of men.

In the determination of the justneso o_

upon
an act, Perelman points out that we must first agree
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the appropriate applicable rule, and must then
further agree

upon its interpretation 56
.

What is not in question for

this determination is the justness of the rule
itself.

The process is rational and deductive.

It has been

pointed out that decisions rendered and actions
performed according to rule or precedent satisfy; that it
is

natural and rational that a decision or action in one
case be essentially the same decision or action for other

similar cases.

Change demands justification.

Persons are said to be just or unjust simply as

a

function of the justice or injustice of their acts, pre-

senting us with none of the conceptual difficulty that
we encounter in the determination of the justice or the

injustice of the rule.

Is the rule itself just?

It

can at least be said with confidence and as a necessary

condition thereof that

a

just rule is not arbitrary;

it

must have some basis in reason, "even if that basis does
not command unanimous agreement."

good laws, per se)
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(even otherwise

Laws

imposed as a mere demonstration of

the power and putative authority of those imposing them

are paradigmatically arbitrary, and therefore unjust.

Reference to "pre-existing reality or to

a

rational system
C O

designed with a view to giving effects to an ideal end"
are cited by Perelman as taking the rule out of the realm
of the arbitrary.

Where conflicts are encountered in simultaneous
appli-

cation of several rules, recourse must be had either to
a rule of a higher order in which the several rules

may be reconciled as compatible or reconcilable variables,
or else to an equity forum wherein a judge will divert

the technical operation of a rule to avoid clear injustice
in the immediate and perhaps unanticipated fact situation

presented to the court.

Equity is thus seen as taking

the rough edges off the mechanical operation of the law;

but if equity too frequently supercedes law, then in the

absence of a change in the law, the
ened.

lav/

itself is week-

Notwithstanding the merit of such statements as:

"The passage to and fro between certainty and equity,

between equity and certainty, is the very life of jurisprudence and determines more particularly the idea we
form of the role in the legal system of the supreme court,"
rules should by and large be followed and should be just.
Rules of concrete justice are founded in what Perelman

originally felt to be the arbitrarily chosen values of
the rule-giver;

and while the determination of whether

a rule of concrete justice flov/ed logically from the given

value

was susceptible to deductive reasoning, never-

theless all that could be done, he thought, with regard
to the resolution of disagreements concerning competing

values was to note the fact that differences existed.

As Hart notes in his introduction to Perelman'

s

book dis-

agreements of this order concerning the characteristics
to be taken as essential in the application of formal

justice result in different concrete formulae of justice.
If a shared and wider moral principle can be brought to

light the disagreement might end there;
this is not the case.

but usually

Perelman progresses from a position

holding that reason has no part to play in disagreements
over values to a position holding that some degree of
reasoning about values is attainable in techniques of
"actual argument."

No argument takes place in

a

void:

"when the disputants approach each other they already
owe allegiance to certain common principles of both

thought and conduct and are eager to classify the instant
case under familiar traditional general rubrics and then

treat it as other cases so classified in the past have

been treated.

Argument most often proceeds by linking

a disputed thesis to precedents already acknowledged

and their use in this way is another application of the

formal principle that like cases be treated alike."
As the values of a society shift and change and de-

velop so also do its concrete formulae of justice;

and

Perelman analogizes this to the shifting classification
of natural phenomena for inclusion in ever more embracing

scientific laws.

The inductive procedures of science in

reformulating statements of natural law become the
model:
just as scientific laws are reformulated to take into

account observations of phenomena not in technical conformity v/ith earlier statements of the law, so to some

extent do deontic positions yield to reformulation in
the process of resolving disagrements at the normative

base of justice.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment is essentially a prescription for formal justice, calling for like treatment for persons forming part

of the same essential category.

Positive law, such at

the Massachusetts Mental Health Act and the regulations

issued thereunder, establishes the categories, without

which the administration of justice is quite impossible

0
.

A state which violates a rule of concrete justice which
it has itself set is, on that occasion, unjust.

The

state has made a determination of essential categories

with regard to the mentally retarded, implying to some
extent the value system of that society as reflected in

legislative action and executive performance.

While the

matter of admission and discharge from state facilities
appears to come more within the scope of legislatively

determined essential categories, the essential subcategorie$ within that general class, for unnumerable institu
tional purposes, more directly reflects the value system

of the commissioner, the superintendents, and (within the

limits of delegation) the whole line of their subordinates.
No effective forum for the resolution of disagreements
in their determination of essential categories exists

under the present state of the law;

furthermore, they

in no way constitute an impartial equity tribunal designed

to prevent the treating with excessive inequality persons

forming part of the same essential category.

Where, for

example, the superintendent establishes as an essential

category all those of the residents able to walk and rules
that these and only these shall receive an academic edu-

cation (citing reasons of self mobility and its attendant

administrative convenience)

,

the only court of equity

jurisdiction in or above the facility structure itself is
the facility superintendent himself or his controlled

subordinates.

To what extent can one realistically expect

their understanding or assistance in handling the simultaneous overlap of the superintendent's established cate-

gory and a proposed alternative which would prescribe (for
example)

an academic education for all within that category

comprised of those above

a

certain minimum level of intel-

lectual ability? Incidentally, this later category is express

provided in the operative positive law, and has never been
fully or effectively implemented by the past superintendents.
to and
The physical transporting of non-ambulatory residents
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from the education building has been traditionally
elevated
to the status of dominant factor.

Rules of the facility, even if they comply with the

minimal demands of 'static justice,' too often are arbitrary in classifying residents in ways calculated more to

simplify administration and the handling of the resident

population than to provide the care and treatment reflected
in and reguired by

<-he

positive law.

Superintendents have

traditionally valued custodial functions higher than
habilitative or rehabilitative functions, and this emphasis
has inevitably played a part in the formulation of institu-

tional rules and policies.
The rules that are codified in statutes or regulations

simply do not and cannot anticipate the innumerable sit-

uations that require the establishment of further uncodified
rules governing the day to day functioning of the institution;

and it is not here suggested that we deprive the

administrators of their rule making function, for to do so

would impair the effectiveness of the facility to the detriment of the residents themselves.

But to the extent that

the rule making power is exercised in areas touching on
the basic civil and legal ricrhts of the residents, it

simply cannot be exercised independently of the checks and

balances which could be provided for by the proposed legislation or its substantial equivalent.

In most cases it can be shown that
treatments and

policies of treatment which have previously been
isolated as preanalytically offensive are in fact
not in

conformity with the correct application of an existing
rule of positive law.

This is, by definition, unjust.

A grouping of the offensive conditions under the heading
of appropriate civil or legal rights that have been vio-

lated, whether expressly articulated in statute or regu-

lation or incorporated therein by reference, would more

clearly demonstrate this nonconformity.

And as difficult

as it may have been to remedy the inequities of purely

institutional rules, so equally are we unequipped at
present to remedy the injustice of acts in direct conflict with positive law.
To the suggestion that clearly defined statutory

prescriptions give rise to legal rights to secure their
enforcement it is answerable that the suggestion fails
adequately to take into account the nature of the class
of persons affected.

The recognition of rights and the

intelligent pursuit of remedies for their infringement
requires the very abilities, deficiencies in which define
the class itself.
If it is seen that simultaneous application of more

than one provision of the Act or the departmental regulations, being

themselves formulae of concrete justice,
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or that the application of the same provision thereof
in different circumstances, produces contradictions

which make it impossible for the requirements of formal
justice ("persons forming part of the same essential category ought to be treated alike") to be met, then we are
left with no other recourse than to a forum of equity.

But without legislation similar to that we propose,

these conflicts would never reach an equity tribunal, but

would inevitably be resolved according to the degree of
importance attached by the administrator to the com-

peting characteristics.

In effect the administrator

generates new and complex characteristics having at least
as many variables as there are conflicting provisions

of the rule, ranked in his particular order of preference.

The population of the Infirmary building, to cite one

concrete instance at Belchertown, traditionally is comprised
of those whose physical deficiencies and general immobility

have quite rationally rendered them
gory of persons.

a

homogeneous cate-

The building, however, is equipped with

a single elevator whose history of reliability is unim-

pressive.

There are two stairwells, which for the limited

number of the building's inhabitants able to walk and able
to negotiate the heavy locked metal doors are otherwise

quite suitable as a means of exiting the building.
are no adequate ramps for the nonambulatory

.

There

There have
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never been more then

a

handfull of attendants present

to assist in the event of emergency evacuation.

interestingly

,

But most

there are state laws requiring adequate

ramps and other equipment and building modification for

buildings designated and used for such purposes.

Why have

commissioners and superintendents and stewards and all the
other administrative personnel chosen to resolve the conflict between the need for homogeneous housing and a rule
of positive law in favor of the former? What made them see
a conflict between the two at all? But they have seen it as
a

conflict and have resolved that conflict in

unjust.

a

way that is

We have, in short, in this instance and in innumer-

able other instances at Belchertown been forced to endure
the imposition of one value system over all others.

The process of "actual argument" to which Perelman

has ultimate recourse as a means of supporting deontic

major premises calling for equal treatment for persons
in a given essential category as against a competing

essential category usually culminates (and usually in

a

judicial setting) in statements often used in political

argument in which the notion of equality remains unanalvzed
and is used in a manner "confusina to the advocates,
and encouraging to the enemies, of that ideal."

The

usual point of departure in any such argument is a dispute between persons relating to the observable differ-
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ences

among members of the combined classes of persons

under discussion.

ihe transition from the uncontradicted

assertion of actual observable differences among the members of the combined classes to deontic propositions

concerning the sub-classes thereof isolates the point of
divergence between the disputants.

Any analysis of the

notion of equality must therefore focus on this transitional area.

Bernard Williams has generated an analysis operating
on the premise that in actual discourse the term 'equality'
is used meaningfully, as making a factual claim relative

to characteristics properly possessed by two or more per-

sons, being neither construed as trivially true ("all per-

sons share a common humanity") nor as absurdly untrue
("no

two persons are really equal").

"When the statement

of equality ceases to claim more than is warranted, it

rather rapidly reaches the point where it claims less than
is interesting."
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Preanalytic concensus that men should be treated alike
in similar circumstances appears to be the limit of judicial

analysis, at least so far as that analysis has been officially
reported.

A corrolary to the principle of formal justice

is that "for every difference in the way men are treated,

some general reason or principle of differentiation must
be given." 6

'*
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The difficulty in stopping analysis at this point
is that the principle makes demands that can simultane-

ously be satisfied by both disputants, each pointing out
actual inequalities that correlate with his own proposed

differences in treatment.

While precedents state that

st this point relevance must be considered, it propels
the disputants into evaluative questions with no guide-

lines on the further resolution of their divergent deontic

views
In the capacity to feel pain, physical or perceptual,

in the capacity to experience the happiness of affection

or the anguish of its absence, and in the innumerable

other natural capacities that characterize human beings, we
find substance to the

‘trivial* predication of common

humanity to all persons in our society, notwithstanding
that such capacities can vary widely in degree among

actual men.

These are among capacities that are possessed

by institutionalized retardates no less than by any of
us;

and perahps because of deprivations in skills and

abilities possessed by others in different circumstances,
these persons may well have developed and cultivated such

fundamental capacities to a degree of sensitivity beyond
The Belchertown situation

the so-called normal person.

was and might continue to be an example of where "political
and social arrangements

.

.

.

systematically neglect these
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characteristics in the case of some groups of men,
while
being fully aware of them in the case of others. "65
The moral worth of an individual, as this
might be

mirrored in differences in treatment accorded him,
cannot
without a "feeling of outrageous absurdity" 66 be dependent
on contingencies such as unequal natural endowment and

fortuitously distributed capacities.

Persons differen-

tiated and segregated from society by virtue of intellectual

deficiencies are exposed to administrative reinforcement
of such differentiation by the very social arrangements

themselves.

The resident is typically not encouraged

to concentrate on his points of similarity to others in

society, but is through institutional procedures led to

believe that the differences, and not the similarities,
are of ultimate importance.

As Williams points out,

"men

are at least potentially conscious, to an indeterminate

degree, of their situation and of what

I

have called

their 'titles,' are capable of reflectively standing
back from the roles and positions in which they are cast;
and this reflective consciousness may be enhanced or

diminished by their social condition."

Persons who

believe in the justness and appropriateness of their
social placement collectively and in general constitute
a more easily

managed population;

and as previously noted,

population management has high standing in the ranking

of administration values.

To the extent that the residents

reflect on their placement with such belief, and to the
extent that they believe such placement to be
of nature with no real opportunities

a

necessity

for improvement,

the more it takes on the appearance of what Williams terms
"the deliberate prevention of growth of consciousness,

which is a poisonous element absent from the original
ideal

1,68
.

The consciousness of the resident to the parameters
of his situation is relevant to a matter earlier discussed
-

namely, that person's posture with regard to the securing

of civil and legal rights.

The Williams analysis makes

a critical distinction between a man's rights

(the reasons

why he should be treated in a certain way) and that man's
power to secure those rights (the reasons for and the

means of getting what he deserves)

.

He cites the case

of a legal right possessed equally by a rich man and a

poor man, in which instance the law granting that right
(without an affirmative action component) can be said to
.be

fair and equal only by the cynical, owing to the

expense associated with its attainment.

That case anal-

ogizes to our case in point in which consciousness of
rights conferred by the Mental Health Act and related
law is, as a practical matter, a necessary condition
for their attainment.

Williams sees the combination

68

of relevance of reasons for unequal treatment and the

operativeness of reasons as a strengthening of the principle of formal justice:

that in addition to giving a

reason for treating persons differently, the reason
should be relevant and socially operative.
It cannot be said that the Massachusetts mental

health laws are socially operative.

They are, in fact,

merely administratively operative, institutionally operative, selectively operative, and in accordance only with
the unsupervised discretion of the state and its agents.

The existence of civil and legal rights is an abstraction

with no power to console those who, for whatever benign
motive, have been deprived of such rights;

what is of

concern is the extent to which those rights govern what

actually happens in the lives the institutional residents.

Investigations have established that what actually happens
is traceable less to operative law and regulation than

to administration personality.

Such

a

state of affairs is

incompatible with the notion of justice.
Something that must not be overlooked in discussing

realistically the opportunities that are available to the
institutional resident is that their individual potentials

differ in fact from the potentials of others in

a

given

society, as a function of their intellectual or other de-

ficiencies.

It would be as wrong to hold out the hope of
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higher educational excellence to

a

mildly retarded person

as it would be to deprive him altogether of
basic learning

Quite obviously we have seldom had to deal with

excesses in the former, while the latter has figured

prominently in current criticisms of the administration's
performance

.

To what extent must the state provide

equality of opportunity to the residents?

That concept is

very obscure* but notwithstanding the conceptual difficulty

encountered in analyzing the concept of equality of opportunity, its denial most nearly characterizes institutional’

deprivations than any other concept we have dealt with so
far.

Accordingly, it is worth further discussion.

Williams treats the notion of equality of opportunity
in the normal political sense of equality of opportunity

for everyone in society to secure certain goods.

The

goods in question are those which, even if not desired
by all, are desired by or for most persons in that society,
and are goods which may be said to be earned, but which

not all who desire can have.

The inability of all in a

society to have such goods may be because the goods
are by their very nature limited in number, or

(2)

(1)

are

contingently limited, in the sense that there are certain
conditions of access to them which in fact not everyone
satisfies, there being no intrinsic limit to the numbers

which might gain access to it by satisfying the conditions,

70

or

(3)

are fortuitously limited, such as an
inadequacy of

supply.

The foregoing analysis yields the conclusion

that for there to be equality of opportunity

a

good must be allocated on grounds which do not

limited
a

priori

exclude any section of those that desire it, on grounds
other than those appropriate or rational for the good in
question, where by 'appropriate' grounds is meant grounds
-

all have an equal chance of satisfying.
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The future of the institutions may well be character-

ized by populations of persons for whom no viable resi-

dential alternative exists.

The price they must pay for

the benefits of residence must not be so high as to entail
an involuntary severance from otherwise available oppor-

tunities;

most especially is this the case where oppor-

tunities are minimized or curtailed in the name of smooth

institutional management.

Equality of opportunity is de-

nied "if the allocation of the good in question in fact

works out unequally or disproportionately between different
sections of society, if the unsuccessful sections are

under a disadvantage which could be removed by further

reform or social action.

The Williams analysis con-

tinues with a discussion as to the extent to which the

direct equalling-up of conditions is appropriate to re-

move the operative disadvantage.

There is no logical

limit to this process, for persons would have become
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"pure subjects or bearers of predicates, everything
else

about them

.

.

.

being regarded as

able characteristic

." 73

fortuitous and change-

a

Equality of opportunity and

absolute equality converge to identical concepts.
In the context of the state facilities for the retarded

we first encounter and must first deal with institutionally

created disadvantages;

before any program of 'reform or

social action' can be effectively initiated we must
reach a starting point where no direct infringement of

rights and opportunities is being perpetrated upon the

resident population by the facility administrators.

At

very least there can be no overt discrimination and at
very best there should be a comprehensive habilitative

program (which, by the way, has long been a legislative
mandate) aimed at maximizing resident potential within the

reasonable limitations of the institutional environment.

Neither Williams nor

I

opt for

a

Utopianism which

does away with the endless fascinating differences that

exist among the persons that make up our entire social
community.

It is a point well made that overemphasis on

equality of opportunity might lead to the destruction of a
certain sense of common humanity which is an ideal of

equality itself.
But conversely it is the principle point of this

paper that programmed reinforcement of natural differences
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becomes a malignant growth which feeds on itself until
3 person s naturally limited abilities are either dimin-

ished or totally destroyed.

VI

It has been suggested in this paper that maladminis-

tration of the laws that relate to the mentally retarded
has often taken the form of excess imposition of_custodial

protection.

Custodial or protective restraint is, never-

theless, as appropriate for the profoundly retarded resident
at a state facility as is its absence for those whom

society deems to be fully competant.

It is then the sub-

stantial middle of the spectrum ranging between the two
that requires further analysis.

To what extent and in

what way is restraint upon individual self-determination

warranted (or correlatively to what extent

is autonomy

justifiably denied) when such restraint is effected by
the state and directed toward marginally retarded residents?
By 'marginally retarded' will be meant essentially a

class of all those who are neither profoundly retarded

nor fully competant, but who occupy the range between the
two
By the fact of residence, the resident submits to

the power of the state administrators.

That power is
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exercised in ways which might be characterized as
mixtures
of protection and limited autonomy.
The proportions
of

each are at least theoretically correlated with
the degree
of mental retardation.

Mere autonomy would in theory be

appropriate for the mildly retarded resident than for the
severely retarded resident, for whom in theory more custodial protection would be desirable.

But this broad

brush analysis is clearly inadeguate for our oumoses;

a

more critical examination is needed into the characteristics of the entire mid-spectrum class itself.

Departmental regulations have sub-classified the
retarded according to placement on

metric scale:

a

standardized psycho-

the retarded, as a class, are thus defined

as all those testing below 80 IQ on the Stanford-Binet

The five sub-classes are:

testing between

0

(1)

profoundly retarded

and 20 IQ on that scale;

(2)

-

those

severely

retarded

-

those testing between 21 and 35 IQ;

(3)

moderately

retarded

-

those testing between 36 and 51 IQ;

(4)

mildly

retarded

-

those testing between 52 and 64 IQ;

(5)

border-

line retarded

-

those testing between 65 and 79 IQ.

The continuing justification for the very existence of
the institution

paper)

(which is itself not challenged by this

is that tc some extent every truly mentally retarded

person does require the structured protection of society.
But in what areas and to what degree the state's protective
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power should transform from supervision or advice into
restrictions upon the individual's otherwise possessed
right of self-determination are questions which can only
be answered after comprehensive assessment of the

individual's present abilities and his capacity for
change and improvement.

Failure to adequately protect

profoundly retarded residents has in the past often led
to serious injury and even death to the individual and

other residents.

The typical consequences of such inad-

equacy are immediate, physical and therefore observable.
The consequences of overprotection or excessive restraint

upon self-determination (considered here as

a

documented

fact aside from the good or bad motives of those effecting
it)

are typically less observable, more difficult to

isolate for discussion and analysis, but no less real or

harmful to the persons affected.
The difficulties encountered in determining types

and degrees of protection and autonomy for the individual

resident are innumerable and complex.
a

There is, for example,

tendency to assume that a diagnosis of 'retarded' is

properly retained for life.

There is, however, no ade-

quate test for mental retardation the results of which

would lend themselves to simple determinations of type
or degree of protection and autonomy fcr the individual
tested.

There is no adequate test for determining a per-
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son

'

s

potential at any age;

and the giver of the test

has only the right to say strictly that at the
time of
the test the person tested appears to be capable of
doing

precisely those things that the test purported to test.
IQ tests test only specific points in time and
only

specific areas

,

skills and abilities.

Rules or decisions

founded on projections from such tests suffer from the

deficiencies possessed by the tests themselves in that
the test results speak only of the test subject's skills

and abilities at an earlier time.

Institutional rules,

decisions and programs do operate (and have historically
operated) on the assumption that once a person tests as

retarded to any degree, then that classification is

a

proper

foundation and basis for all further rules, decisions and

programs for him thereafter.

The assumption is evident

in the lack of ongoing administrative analysis of the

resident's actual skills and abilities (intellectual,
emotional, physical or social) and a further lack of

adequate habilitative programs aimed at maximizing the

resident's individual potential in those areas.
An individual once so classified and subsequently

institutionalized historically shows more and more the
characteristics of the retarded due principally to deprivations in intellectual
areas

,

emotional, physical and social
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A person who has been diagnosed as retarded through

testing procedures aimed primariliy at intelligence

measurement is typically classified as retarded in all
other areas as well

-

emotionally, physically and socially.

Intel lectural development is not highly correlated with

emotional, physical or social development;

and yet for

purposes of nearly all administrative decision making
the intelligence criterion is usually determinative.

At least four variables contribute to the inadequacy
of intelligence measurement in standardized tests; the

person being tested, the person giving the test, and
location and environment of the test occasion, and the
test itself.

For example, test questions are read to

subjects in different ways and in different accents by

different people;

inflection, tone, speed and innumerable

other speech factors might well affect the test giver's

ability to adequately communicate the question;

or the

test giver might present a threatening appearance to the

subject for reasons long lost in the subject's background.
The test subject (or for that matter the test giver) might
not be feeling physically well on the test occasion, or

might temporarily be distracted from the matter of the

question by the prospect, for example, of later in the day
going to a movie, on a trip, or the like.

The immediate

environment of the test might give rise to test-invalidating

impact on the subject, for reasons, perhaps,
that the
test was given in a room in which the
subject suffered
a severe embarrassment or other
distressing episode, or
the like.
And the test itself, measuring only
intelligence, does not address the other components
of the

en

^ re

P e ^son that have a direct relationship on the

ability to function in society.

Mental retardation has

traditionally been viewed as the equivalent of intelligence retardation:

but intelligence is simply not the only

component of the human mind or person.
Moreover, the ongoing effectiveness of habilitative

programs (to the extent that the test subject participates therein)

,

growth spurts, and innumerable other factor

make necessary frequent reassessment of the resident's

retardation, without which no intelligent planning can
be had regarding the appropriate type and degree of pro-

tection or autonomy to be prescribed for the individual

concerned
It must further be observed that there exists a basic

incompatibility between human development and excessive

institutional protectiveness.

Such excess denies a

person a right as a human being to
use Maslow's expression.

'

self-actualize

'

,

to

The deprivation of a normally

stimulating social environment unquestionably has
ing effect on human development.

a

retard-

Social and emotional
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growth takes place through integration with peer groups,
family groups, and groups of countless other social varieties.

The institutional resident has historically been

deprived of the opportunities for such integration,
deeping (or causing) retardation in the specific area of
deprivation.

The transition, for example, from parallel

play to cooperative play is inhibited by the large numbers
of persons who (typically for convenience of supervision

by limited staff)

are herded together for long periods

of time in what is neutrally termed 'the day hall.'

As Maslow explains regarding the hierarchy of needs, there

must be at least partial fulfilment at one level prior to
any possibility of advancement to the next level.

person of relatively low 'mental age'

A

(however correlated

or uncorrelated with chronological age) will simply not

realize his potential in the excessive-restraint environ-

ment of the day hall.
Human development has been fruitfully analogized to

block building;

certain more complex skills and abilities

must be sequenced to follow previously mastered skills
and abilities.

Without prior achievement of the basics

there can be no significant development.

Moreover with

the passage of time during which no progression from one

level of development to another takes place, the individual
tends to varying degrees to lose the ability itself to

develop at all.
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The appearance of being retarded seems
to be the

all too prominent but tacitly operative
criterion of

retardation for most persons (including many
professionals)
that come in contact with institutional residents.
Having
concluded in advance to a theory which establishes
a

correlation between retardation and appearances, subsequent observation ceases being scientifically objective
and becomes, to the detriment of the observed, theory

laden and defective.

The results are usually inaccurate

and always too imprecise to be fruitful in dealing con-

structively with the retarded.
In times past deaf children have often been viewed
as being retarded;

performance deficiencies directly

attributable to an inability to hear, uncritically accepted
as controlling evidence of retardation, might well have

been eliminable through an adequate analysis of the individual and the appropriate affirmative action adapted to
his remaining senses.

Recourse to appearances as the operative criterion
of mental retardation gives us little to criticize but

its improbable generality.

But when particular appearances

are cited then our criticism becomes more promising.

For

example, in the area of speech development, it can clearly
be said that our society so highly regards the ability to

communicate through speech that an inability to do so creates
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a practical presumption of mental retardation;

and at

very least, that inability converts directly into lower
scores in intelligence testing where the verbal component
of the testing procedures is significant.

The non-devel-

opment or under-develcpment of speech is compatible with

many forms of mental retardation;

but it is also compatible

with cerebral palsy and other physical conditions which
typically coexist with normal intelligence.

motor development, a person born with

a

In the area of

spinal bifida

(a

knotting and breaking of the nerves of the spinal cord)
may be observed as having the same appearances as a

severely to moderately retarded child.

A number of now

retarded persons have endured, to their detriment, such
a misdiagnosis,

and in consequence been rendered socially

and emotionally retarded by the imposed institutional

environment.

While it is speculative what their original

potential might have been at normal functioning, it
speculative to say that whatever their

is not

potential might

have been originally, its development was seriously and

even permanently retarded.

Such persons, as adults, have

become foreicrners in their own land because as children
they were diagnosed as retarded and placed in an institution lacking in opportunities to integrate socially,

emotionally, intellectually, and physically into the social

mainstream
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While it is true to say that many persons in
the

intellectually normal range have been institutionalized
as
retarded, after being judged so on the basis of emotional,
'

social, physical or verbal deficiency, it is conversely
the case that many q\iite retarded persons have achieved

normal social, emotional or verbal characteristics

*iui.t.e

and are often taken to be not retarded.
In one actual case the same standardized test was

given to two individual residents, both girls of approximately the same chronological age.

Subject A was

socially adept, could relate to adults and peer groups in
socially acceptable fashion, and was generally accomplished
verbally.

She appeared alert, happy and physically average

for her age.

She was achieving in a classroom for the

retarded at a rate superior to others in the same class,
in all areas.

She seemed in every way as completely self-

supportive as any individual of her age.

The test, how-

ever, showed her to be retarded with an IQ of 72.

Subject

B acted immature for her age in interacting with both adults

and her peers.

She appeared dull, functioned at a lower

level verbally than others of her age and showed little

reaction to her surroundings.

well as others

She did not progress as

in her classroom, in all areas.

She demon-

strated a need for more supervision in decision making activities.

The test showed her to be retarded with an IQ of 72.
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Going back to the earlier discussed prohibition
of
local store visits, such an administrative rule
would

clearly be more appropriate for Subject B than for
Subject A t for whom the restriction of autonomy in
such

matters

would achieve only the further retarding of

ability and potential at normal social intercourse.

What the test results should have said to the administrators is that intelligence test results do no lend themselves to a direct determination of appropriate degrees
or types of autonomy or restraint;

instead, a rule

of convenience w as framed which was geared to the lowest

common denominator.

Instead of programs of habilitation

aimed at bringing Subject B up to her suggested potential
for normal social functioning, programs of restraint and

excessive protectiveness were established which had the
effect of bringing Subject A to

a

lower level of social

achievement than her suggested potential.

Compounding the administrative sins of non-diagnosis
and mis-diagnosis and failure to establish habilitative

programs, currently the state administrators feel that
the mistakes of years can be absolved in days through

virtually immediate discharge of the non-habilitatea
resident.

However unequipped and unprepared to cope with

such commonplace demands as are encountered in shopping,

renting, travelling, and so on, they are sent off with the

dubious blessing of the state to seek their fortune in a

world with which they have been programatically and wrongfully deprived of contact.

Society usually expects its

young adults to encounter some difficulty in the task
of integrating auonomously into adult society, even with

the obvious benefits of its being a gradual process, and
a process engaged in within the comfortable context of

normal family environments.

The state, on the other

hand, deals with the discharged resident as if he or she

should know the behavior appropriate for all conventional
social situations, and furthermore to be proficient in it.

Marginally retarded persons can often do

ijiany

of

the things the ability to do which in the aggregate cus-

tomarily define the fully competent person.

VJhat

concerns

us at this point in the discussion is the substance and

the implementation of the state 'rules' to the extent (as

indicated earlier in the context of the equal protection
clause)

that they can affect the individual in his life,

liberty, property and pursuit of happiness.

The equal pro-

tection clause requires that the substance and the imple-

mentation of the rules be based on 'proper and justifiable
distinctions, considering the purpose of the law.'
The institutional rule, for example, prohibiting the

resident from freely visiting local stores is incompatible
which prowith the mandate of the equal protection clause
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scribes rules which operate on persons without regard
to

their relavent. differences (in this example in their

varying abilities in meeting the demands of store visits)
The equal protection clause prohibits the state from

affecting the lives of persons in the same class (in this
example the appropriate class being 'all those capable
of negotiating store visits, or at least with the poten-

tial of having that capability') in significantly different

ways.

An institutional rule prohibiting all residents

from making store visits, while having an appropriate

effect upon a profoundly retarded person, nevertheless

when applied to

a

borderline retarded (or to a retarded of

any other degree who in fact possesses the ability in

question)

it has the effect of depriving him of developing

or improving that ability to a point more nearly that

possessed by the fully competent person.
Protective functions exercised by institutional

administrators are justified only when there is protective
need on the part of the proposed object of those functions.
But many of the protective functions historically

exercised by institutional administrators have been aimed
at achieving administrative convenience and have been

uncorrelated with those protective needs.
Therefore those protective functions that are so un-

correlated are unjustifiable.
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It can be said of store visits that they
are complex

social tasks requiring certain mixed minimum abilities,
some of which are physical (to walk distances, to
see and

hear traffic and other people, etc.)

some verbal or social

(to relate to and to communicate with storekeepers, etc.),

some intellectual

(to select store items, to order, read

^^kcls, count change)

,

and some emotional or maturational

(to perform the task without being sidetracked into other

pursuits, or without being disoriented as to the hazards

encountered in any contact with a relatively fast moving
social setting)

.

The rule of prohibition effectively

denies equal protections of the laws to those clearly

having the ability to perform such tasks and also to
those who have the potential of doing so, who through

suitable habilitative programs and an affirmative action
by administrators could achieve that ability.

Rules

which have the effect of depriving the resident of developmental opportunities are violative of the equal protection clause.
To the challenge that the matter of store visits is
not in itself significant enough to warrant the imposition

constitutional sanctions, it must be indicated that this
has been selected as merely one example from a list of

frightening proportions.

The impact of one such restriction

on self-determination might well be minimal;

but the impact
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of the aggregate of institutional restraints and restrictions

touches seriously upon the life, liberty, property and

pursuit of happiness of the residents, unquestionably
reaching issuable proportions.
Institutional procedures and rules that fail to take
into account the complex nature of individual abilities
and the complex structure of human endeavors, and which
as a consequence retard residents from finding and exer-

cising their individual areas of competence, are unjust
and unconstitutional.

Having chosen, by law, to operate

within the field of mental retardation and to administer
facilities for the care and treatment of the mentally
retarded, the state has therein chosen to exercise state

power over a class of persons defined only, by that law,
as being below a given level of intelligence.

The manner

in which the state has exercised that power has been shown

in this paper to have been violative of a theory of justice

and violative of the U. S. Constitution.
The current outlines of change in the area of state

mental health administration have not adequately incor-

porated anything like the theoretical framework treated at
length above, but appear to be taking the form of

a

con-

vulsive restaffing of departmental and institutional personnel with the hope of filling positions with more

enlightened persons.

This approach strikes at symptoms.
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not causes.
It must first be established and understood within

what conceptual framework the care and treatment of the
mentally retarded are to be pursued, and then that framework must be buttressed by appropriate and effective
guarantees for implementation.

A right granted without

its being coupled to an administrative or leqal but

available remedy for its infringement is empty and
right in name only.

a

An office legislatively created and

charged with the duty of overseeing the performance of
administrative activities and with measuring those activities against

a

standard of law and justice comes nearer

than any proposed alternative to providing such a guarantee.

Being independently answerable to the legislature alone, such
an office bypasses that departmental roadblock which has
in the past insulated its members from meritorious

challenges to the justness of their activities.
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APPENDIX A

:

House Bill No. 2690
By Mr. Flaherty of Cambridge, petition of Charles F.
Flaherty, Jr., and another for legislation to establish
a division of mental health legal assistance under the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee. The Judiciary.
"The Commonwealth of Massachusetts: In the Year One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Two.
"

An Act Establishing a Division of Mental Health Leaal
Assistance Under the' Massachusetts Defenders Committee

-

.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the
same, as follows:

"Chapter 221 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
inserting after section 34D, the following new section:

-

"Section 34E.
In addition to the functions of the Massachusetts defenders committee under section thirty-four D
of chapter two hundred twenty-one, said committee shall
establish and maintain a division of mental health legal
assistance. The committee shall appoint as director of said
division a member of the Massachusetts bar who shall serve
under and be directly responsible to the committee and
who shall, subject to the approval of the committee,
appoint and may remove mental health legal advisers, who
shall also be members of the Massachusetts bar. A mental
health legal adviser shall perform all duties assigned
under the appropriate provisions of chapter one hundred
twenty-three and such other duties as may be assigned
from time to time by the director. A mental health legal
adviser shall assist and advise patients and residents
at the Bridgewater State Hospital and patients under
court order at other public and private facilities concerning their legal rights as provided under this chapter and
shall advise and arrange for appropriate legal representation of such party where otherwise necessary. A mental
health legal adviser may consent to represent a patient in
court proceedings if requested to so act by the patient
and after a finding by the court that such patient is
indigent. A mental health legal adviser may examine all
necessary patients' records, records of such facilities and
records of the department of mental health and may make
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such other inquiries as may be necessary to carry out his
duties hereunder. Except where disclosure is for the welfare or benefit of the patient, information so obtained
shall be confidential and not disclosed to others than
the members of the Massachusetts defenders committee
appointed under section thirty-four D of chapter two
hundred twenty-one and to the director of said division
of mental health legal assistance and members of the staff
of the division.
Said committee shall adopt such rules
and regulations as may be necessary for the care of its
affairs hereunder and may from time to time amend or
revise the same without further approval; provided,
however that in the adoption of such rules and regulations
said committee in instances deemed appropriate by it, may
consult with the department of mental health, the department
of correction and such other public or private institutions
and personnel thereof, as may be of assistance to the
effectuation of the purposes hereof. Said director shall,
subject to the approval of said committee, appoint such
professional or non-professional aides, clerical and other
assistants as may be necessary to carry out the duties
of the committee hereunder and said committee shall provide
suitable accomodations throughout the commonwealth. The
director and other employees appointed hereunder shall not
be subject to the provisions of chapter thirty-one.
Said
committee for the purposes hereof, may accept gifts, grants
or contributions from any source whether public or private
and may expend the same.
,

"Upon petition of a patient or resident in mental health
and retardation facilities of the mental health department,
or a patient at the Bridgewater State Hospital, or a patient
under court order at other public and private faailities,
or the legal guardian or next of kin of said patient, the
court to which such petition is addressed, may appoint a
member of the Massachusetts bar to represent said patient
and to advise said patient in his legal rights."

House Bill No. 2690 was not enacted into law; however,
on October 9, 1973, Chapter 893 of the Laws of 1973 was
approved, providing legal assistance to the indigent mentally ill. Notwithstanding its failure to meet all the
criticisms raised in this paper, Chapter 89 3 goes a long
way toward remedying the deficiencies of exisiting law
relating to retarded citizens. Chapter 893 is reprinted
as Appendix B.

APPENDIX

B:

Chapter 893

- Lav/s

of 1973

An Act providing for legal assistance to the indigent

mentally ill.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of
the
same, as follows:

Chapter 221 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
inserting after section 34D the following section:
"Section 34E. The justices of the supreme judicial court
shall appoint a mental health leaal advisors committee
consisting of fourteen attorneys, four of whom shall hold
office for a term of four years, four for a term of three
years, three for a term of two years and three for a term
of one year.
Upon completion of each such term of a member,
his successor shall be appointed for a term of four years.
The unexpired portion of any term which becomes vacant
shall be filled by the justices of the supreme judicial
court.
Members of said committee may be removed by the
justices of the supreme judicial court. No member of
the committee shall receive any compensation for his services,
but each member shall be reimbursed for actual traveling
expenses incurred by him in attending the committee meetings.
The membership of the committee shall contain a practicing^
attorney or attorneys from each of the mental health regions
of the Commonwealth.
The committee shall annually appoint
and may at any time remove an executive director who
shall be compensated from funds available therefor.
"Any practicing member of the bar of the commonwealth who
wishes to serve as a mental health legal advisor shall submit his name, office address and telephone number to the
committee, which shall compile a list of all such names
submitted, dividing the names into groups of lawyers
practicing within each of the mental health regions of
Said list shall be updated quarterly.
the commonwealth.
Said list of mental health legal advisors shall be circulated by the committee to the district courts and municipal courts of the commonwealth and to the department
The committee shall annually establish
of mental health.
and approve a fee schedule for such services as shall be
performed by the mental health legal advisors and said
mental health legal advisors shall upon certificate of
the judge appointing him be compensated in accordance
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therewith for services performed for an indigent patient.
It shall be the duty of the committee to develop a program of volunteer leaal assistance. Such program shall
utilize the participation of attorneys, professional
and nonprofessional aides and all other groups who offer
their services on a voluntary basis, to assist and advise
indigent patients and residents in Bridgewater state
hospital and all other mental health and retardation
facilities of the commonwealth concerning their legal
rights.
Said volunteers may, subject to the approval
of the committee, interview and examine all pertinent
records of any such patient or resident. In addition,
the committee shall appoint such clerical or other nonprofessional staff assistants as may be necessary to carry
out the duties of the committee.
"It shall be the duty of the committee to conduct a continuing program of information with regard to the legal
rights of patients and residents at all mental health and
retardation facilities in the commonwealth, which information shall be circulated to said patients and residents
and their relatives to the employees of the department
of mental health, the members of the bar of the commonwealth and to anyone requesting such information.
In
addition, such information shall be made available to the
public at large.
,

"Upon petition of an indigent patient or resident in
Bridgewater state hospital or any other mental health or
retardation facility, private or public, or the legal
guardian or a relative or a friend of such patient or
resident, to any district or municipal court of the commonwealth, such court shall appoint from the list circulated
of mental health legal advisors, a lawyer, practicing in
the same or an adjoining mental health region as that in
which the court is situated, to advise such patient of
his legal rights and to represent such patient.
"A mental health legal advisor so appointed may examine all
records pertaining to such patient or resident, including
the records of the department of mental health and the
department of correction or any other agency of the government of the commonwealth or any other institution operated
by the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof
In addition,
or any hospital situated in the commonwealth.
as
he deems
inquiries
such advisor may make all necessary
duties.
proper for the carrying out of his

"A mental health legal advisor shall be compensated for
legal services performed for an indigent patient by the
mental health legal advisor's committee in accordance
with the fee schedule established by the mental health
legal advisors committee as provided for herein.

"The committee shall be eligible for federal funds and may
accept gifts, grants or contributions from any source
and may expend the same, for the purpose of compensating
said mental health legal advisors. - Approved October 9,

1973.

"
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APPENDIX C

:

M.G.L.A. Chapter 19

,

Section

16

"There shall be a mental health advisory council consisting
of thirty persons to be appointed by the governor, of whom
at least half shall be members of community mental health
and retardation area boards, and of the remaining half
at least seven shall be appointed to represent one of the
following professions and groups: - state level medical,
psychological, nursing, educational, social work, occupational therapy, or bar associations, state level associations for mental health and for mental retardation, industrial and labor groups and the clergy. Upon the expiration of the term of office of any member, his successor
shall be appointed for a term of three years. No member
shall be appointed to serve more than two consecutive threeyear terms. The council shall elect annually a chairman.
Members of said council shall serve without compensation,
but each member shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth
for all expenses incurred in the performance of his official
duties
"Said advisory council shall have the following duties; (a) It shall advise the commissioner on policy, program
development, and priorities of need in the commonwealth
for comprehensive programs in mental health and retardation;
(b) It shall participate with the department in holding
a regular series of public hearings throughout the commonwealth to obtain the views of the area boards and other
citizens concerning the programs of the department and
the needs of the people in mental health and retardation
services
(c) It shall review the annual plans and the proposed
annual budget of the department, and shall make recommen dations to the commissioner in regard thereto;
731 It shall hold at least three meetings per year and shall
convene special meetings at the call of the chairman or the
council, a majority of the council, or the commissioner. Added St. 1966, Ex. Sess. c. 735, Sec. 1." (emphasis added)
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APPENDIX C

;

Portions of M.G.L.A. Chapter 19, Section 23
The area board shall have the following duties and powers:
to act as the representative of
to advise
to advise
to review and approve
to review arrangements and contracts
to consult
(g) to communicate
(h) to receive and administer any gift or bequest
(i) to receive funds
(j) to hold regular meeting
(k) to elect
Added St. 1966, Ex. Sess., c. 735, Sec. IV
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

It is interesting to note that advantage was taken of the
language appearing in subsection (a) above which authorizes
the area board to "act as the representative of the citizens
of the area;" when the Franklin County area board joined
the class action litigation (Ricci vs. Greenblatt) as an
amicus curiae, in its capacity to represent certain of the
retarded citizens in its area. But this is a very awkward
and unreliable way of achieving the protection of constitutional rights of retarded citizens. Their participation in
the suit, however, had symbolic value and thereby aided in
achieving the results reached in that case.
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APPENDIX D

:

M.G.L.A. Chapter 19, Section 21
"In each area established under section eighteen there shall
be a community mental health and retardation area board,
hereinafter called the area board, which shall be an agency
of the commonwealth
and shall serve in the department
The
area board shal 1 consist of twenty-one members who shall
be appointed by the commissioner.
Two thirds of the members
shall live within the area for which they are appointed,
and the remaining members shall either live or work
within said area. Four members of said board shall be
selected from the mental health associations within
the area; and four members shall be selected from the
associations for the mentally retarded within the area.
The commissioner shall include at least one member from
each city and if practicable each town in the area, and
shall seek to provide proper geographical representation
in the membership of the board.
,

.

,

"Two thirds of such members shall be persons other than
employees of the commonwealth. No member shall be an
employee of the department.

"Upon the expiration of the term of any member of the area
board, his successor shall be appointed, in like manner,
In the event of a vacancy,
for a term of three years.
may,
like
manner, appoint a member
commissioner
in
the
the
remainder
of the unexpired term.
who shall serve for
Members of the board shall serve without compensation, and
shall be sworn to the faithful performance of their duties.
The area board shall suggest for consideration by the commissioner one or more names for each such expiring term
No member shall be appointed for more than
or vacancy.
two consecutive three-year terms. - Added St. 1966, Ex.
Sess., c. 735, Sec. 1." (emphasis added)
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